This study examines the foreign policy of Mohammad Daoud Khan during his presidency (1973–1978) within the broader context of Cold War geopolitics. Following his 1973 coup and the establishment of the Republic of Afghanistan, Daoud’s foreign policy unfolded in two distinct phases. Initially (1973–1976), he aligned closely with the Soviet Union, securing over $600 million in economic and military aid, which modernized Afghanistan’s armed forces and expanded infrastructure. However, this dependence also facilitated deep infiltration of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) into state and military institutions, creating long-term vulnerabilities.

In the second phase (1976–1978), Daoud sought to counterbalance Soviet influence by pivoting toward the West and regional powers, including Iran, Pakistan, and Arab states. While these efforts aimed to diversify alliances and restore autonomy, Western and regional support proved insufficient to offset Soviet dominance. The combination of limited alternative assistance, internal political polarization, and PDPA infiltration culminated in the April 1978 Saur Revolution, a coup backed by pro-Soviet military officers, which ended Daoud’s rule and set the stage for the 1979 Soviet invasion.

Using declassified Soviet and U.S. documents, CIA reports, and scholarly sources, the study demonstrates the structural limitations of realist strategies when applied by a weak state caught between competing great powers. It underscores how external dependency and internal fragility can undermine even rational, survival-oriented foreign policy approaches.